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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ERLIN JACKSON,

Plaintiff and R~t.
vs.

THAIRE R. RICH,
,.,~ ..
DefeniUJlnt alnil A~:·:

BRIEF Of PLAINTIFF

,LOTHAIRE R. RICH

II
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Thia ie to c•rtify tbat on ~rch 18, 1972,

the undersigned ·~ll<!.U ten coni•s of the wil;hin bri~

to ~he C1-rk of the Utah Supre!ltt Court, Capitol

Bld.ldiag, Salt, Lake 01ty, utah; am that he ;ia Utd a
iih& •aa• date three conies to CounHl Lothaire R, lti1
2815 EA•t 3365 South, ~t. I.alee City, vtOlh, 84.109.
That each was mailed wi\h proper ~ostage and in the 1

regular course of
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MERLIN JACKSON,
Plaintiff and Respondent.

vs.
LOTHAIRE R. RICH,

I
(

Case No.

12602

Defendant and Appellant.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts of the within case are simple and uncontroverted, and they are that an oral agreement was entered
into between the Plaintiff, (Respondent) and the Defendant, which agreement was de::;cribed in three letters, from
the Defendant (Ex. P-1, 2, 3) and in concise term3 was:
The plaintiff was engaged by the defendant to do remodeling and repair work on a building which the plaintiff proposed to lease. And also that the plaintiff would do certain
repair work on an adjoining portion of the same building
which the defendant was leasing to someone else, (Bradshaw Auto Parts). That the defendant agreed with the
plaintiff to pay him $3.50 per hour for the said repair
work and remodeling, both in the area to be rented by the
plaintiff and in that portion of the building rented to
others (Ex. P-1).

The labor supplied to the rental part of the unit at
$3.50 per hourwas $1,093.57 (T 56 - 20). The number of
hours per day and the days of the monrth thwt the labor wa;
performed was detailed in tes,timony (T 50 - 19) and (ExP-6). The plaintiff furnished materials and supplies u;,ed
in the remodeling which were also itemized by each invoice
number and sale.:: slip from Peter,~on Machine Co., and
which materials and suppJ:e:; totaled $708.71 (T63-22) (Ex.
P-7). The p'.aintiff aLo provided repairs and improvements to unit of the building rented by others, which de- .
fendant (appellant) stipulatE:d to be the sum of $179.16.
(T 57-7) That the total amount due the p'.a nti~'f ~r rn
the defendant on the unit to be rented by the plaintiff ms
and i3 $1,093.57 fr.r labor; $708.71 for mate1ia's; a:~.J f1c
sum of $179.lG fer improvement.:> to other portion of defendant's building by plaintiff. Accordringly, the defendant owed the plaintiff $1,980.87 as a result of labor and
materials, per their oral agreement, which oral agreement
was supported by defendant's written correspondence and
other documents. (Ex. P-1, 2, 3, 4, & 5.)
The plaintiff rented the rental unit frcm the defend·
ant with paymenh to begin February 1, 1969 (Ex. P-3,
Par. 2, line 3) an<l concluded with eviction and the clear:.
being locked on May 19, 1969, while the plaintiff w~s laid .
up with injuries. That the agreed rent was $140.00 per
month. The parties agreed that one-half of the mrnthly
rental ( $70.00 per month) would be credited by the repair
and improvementi:: m'lde. Defendant wa' to pay the plain·
tiff in cash for the repairs and improvements ( $179.16)
to the auto partR building and motel unit. The clefendant
•)

was to pay plaintiff for materials used at cost plus 10%
(708.71). The defendant was billed for such improvements and materials on Mar. 20, 1969, on April 2, 1969.
April 6, 1969 and April 9, 1969, none of which was paid
by the defendant to the plaintiff (T 61 - line 20-30). Sub~equently plaintiff credited the amount due as rental on
the building and offset the payment as follows:
Total rental due Defendant
$490.00
245.00
One-half rental due in cash
179.18
Labor on Auto Parts Bldg., & Motel
65.82
Difference due Defendant
Total materials purchased from Peterson Machine Co. for Defendant's
708.71
bldg., cost plus 10%
Balance due in cash on rental to
65.82
Defendant
Net balance due Plaintiff from
supplies
Plus Plaintiff's labor on rental unit

$642.89
1093.57

Less one-half rental due in work

1736.46
245.00

Total amount due Plaintiff

$1491.46

The plaintiff testified as to the actual hours of work
performed and a <lay by da\Y itemized account of each day
of labor wac; furnished the defendant. At the trial plaintiff presented three expert witnesses ( T 104 - Mr. Frampton, T 114 - Mr. Vernon Peterson, T 133 - Mr. Brooks Anderson), which wai::. corroboration of the work performed

3

as shown under plaintiff's Exhibit 6. Supplies including
invoice numbers from Peterson's Machine Company were
contained on Exhibit P-7 and corrooorated by testimony
of Lowell Peterson (T 108).
JURY VERDICT
The jury rendered verdict in the sum of $1,229.00 for
repairs, improvements and remodeling performed by the
plaintiff at the instance and request of the defendant, and
offset the payment by the sum of $490.00 for rent due and
unpaid, with a net verdict of $739.00. Evidence justified
the jury crediting Defendant for $58, because of invoice error of $58, inste~d of $.58, and also crediting ('.cfendant for a ccunter and rug removed from the premises
at defendant's request.
There was ample and conclusive testimony to support
the verdict of the jury. The testimony of the three expert
witnesses, Mr. Peterson, Mr. Anderson and Mr. l.«ramprton,
was not to change the theory from damages due on an oral
contract to quantum meruit, but was supporting te3timony that the services and the materials had in fact been
furnished, which repairs and which materials and supplies
the witnesses observed and examined.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
ESTABLISH AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN
PLAINTIFF and DEFENDANT.
4

Ex. "P" 1, a letter from defendant to the plaintiff
refers to an oral agreement in which the defendant states
"This will be perfectly satisfaotory with me". P.S. "verifying $3.50 per hour for labor and whole.,ale plus 10'/o for
materials." Ex. "P" 2. Letter dated Jan. 27, 1969, from
the defendant, is quoted as follows: "I had been waiting
for some weeks, aR I told your wife the la;,t time I was up
that I was agreeable to the time and materials suggestion,
providing you would tell me what it was. You have nou.;
told me and we understand each other". As I stated, I am
perfectly willing to go ahead on that basi:o. I note you have
pretty well put the back on the portion to the middle. We
need to put in a partition in the front window which you
started. I suggest you complete it, a:lso put in a partiition
above the window by the ceiling and the top of the window.
I need to have the rest of the partition on the south finished including hanging the door. I would be glad to pay
you the $3.50 per hour if you will finish up the job." Further quoting paragraph 3, "I suggest that you take the rest
of the month to do the job and let the rent ftart on the 1st
of February." Quoting from paragraph 5, "incidently, besides finishing the partition, I need to have the re'::t of the
wall on the inside perfa-taped as well as that which is put
in the window. I will be glad to pay you for that if you
will finish it up as I have been somewhat under the weather and it has been almost impossible for me to get this
finished."

5

Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 4 further confirms the agre€ment and acknowledges invoices for materials and 1:,upplies
in the sum of $142.00.
Paragraph No. 5 of Exhibit No. 4, written April 17,
1969, is quoted, for the purpose of showing that the agreement between the parties had continued with work and labor being performed and supplie.s being furnished by the
Plaintiff to April of 1969. Quoting from Par. 5, defendanrt states, "I have been very short th:s year due to the fact
that rentalis for me were very bad last year, although it i~
working out fine now. But we must get on a basis where
we can bill it once a month and I should have a full and
total itemized b:Il for your work that you are claiming credit on, and of course I will give you credit on the work in
other room..> such as 5, 13, etc."
Paragraph 6 acknowledges receipt of invoices dated
Mar. 1969. It is quoted as follows: "I note that the invoice dated Mar. 1969 is a general bill and if this is a full
bHI rtlhen of course I am satisfied, if you are. In any event,
let's get it straightened out right away so I will know
where you are going."
Pla:ntiff's Exhibit No. 6 is a day by day itemization
delivered to the defendant by the plaint:ff of hours work
by plaintiff on defendant's building, detaHing the number
of hours per day and by whom the work was performed.
The total labor includes 369 hours for a total amount
of $1272.75. Materials and suppl'es are itemized by invoices and included on Plaintiff's Ex. No. 7. Each invoice
from Peteron's Machine Ccmpany was examined by the
defendant. The plaint'ff t2stified that each item was used

in the repair and improvement of the defendant's premises and none was used ebewhere.
The above referred to communication between Plaintiff and Defendant shows ccmplete meeting of the minds of
the parLe-, constituting a valid contractual agreement.
The primary test as to the actual character of a contract according to authorities and as is cited in Am Jur 2d,
Vu'. 17, pg.

~33,

i..; quoted as follows:

The primary test as to the actual character of a contract is the intention of the parties, to be gathered
from the whole scope and effect of the language
used, and mere verbal formulas, if inconsistent with
the real intention, are to be disregarded. It does
not matter what name the parties chose to designate
it. But the existence of a contract, the meeting of
the minds, the intention to assume an obligation, and
the understanding are to be determine<l in case of
doubt not alone from the words used, but also the
situation, acts, and conduct of the partie\ and the
attendant circum~tances.
Quoting further from Am Jur 2d Vol. 17, pg. 334-335,
the following language is helpful in determining that an
agTeement existed between the parties.
Contracts are said to be either expres<, implied, or
constructivf'. Contracts are expre3'3 when their
terms are f:tated by the parties, and they are often
said fo be implied when the:r terms are not so st?tecl Thus. ::tn implie<l contract is one inferre<l frcm
7

the conduct of the parties, though not expressed in
words.
Contracts may be implied either in iaw or in fact.
Contracts implied in fact are inferred from the fact.s
and circumstancE.s of the case, and are not forma.Jly
or explicitly stated in words. It is often said that
the only difference between an express contract and
a contract implied in fact is that in the former the
parties arrjve at their agreement by words, whether
oral or written, while in the latter their agreement
is arrived at by a consideration of their acts and
conduct, and that in both of the-e cases there ·s, in
fact, a contract existing between the parties, t:1e
only diffen'!nce being in the character of evidence
necessary tn establish it. In other words, 'n an o.pre::s contPtct all the terms and con<.iitions are expressed between the parties, while in an implied contract some one or more of the terms and conditions are implied from the conduct of the pa.rties.
The source of the obligaltion of express contracts and
contracts implied in fact is the manifested intenrtion
of the parties. An implied contract between two
parties is raised only when the facts are such that
an intent may fairly be inferred on their part to
make such a contract. All the pertinent circumstances must be taken into consideration.
According to authorities, an Agreement by conduct
is jusit as binding as one made by words. Ahern vs. South
Buffalo Railroad Company, 344 US 367.
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has likewiE-e
held that the interpretation of an oral agreement is ascer8

tained by the meaning given to the words and manifestta.tion of the parties in determining their intent. Fuhriman
Inc., vs. Jarrell 445 Pac. 2d 136. In the Fuhriman case an
oral agreement was had between the parties involving rent
on a home occupied by defendant, while builder was con~tructing defendant's home.
The Supreme Court upheld
the interpretation of the trial court, stating "that it is a
duty of the trial court to determine the meaning to be given
worc'.s and intention of the parties."
In the instant case, there wa 1 adEquate evidence and
te,timony to establish the intention of the parties and to
justify the jury and their award for damages based upon
the ag. eement of the parties. The figures on one invoice
had been transposed and the change of $58.00 to $.58 was
properly altered by the jury. The jury also credited defendant with a counter and rug plaintiff removed at defendant's request.
In determining the issues involved the Supreme
Court has the duty to review the evidence in light most
favorable to the trial court's findings. Lynch v.s. McDonald 367 Pac. 2d, 464. Weenig vs. Manning 262 Pac. 2d 491.
Parrish vs.Tahtaras 318 Pac. 2d, 642. In quoting from
Lynch vs. McDonald Supra,
"While some of the testimony h aclmittedly in conflict and n0t in ccmplete harmony with testimony
given in companion case, we find there ;s amp'e
competent, sub-tantial, clear and convincing evidence to sul)port the facts there:n."
And the same is applicable to the instant ca-e. There is
9

ample competent, substantial, clea,r and convincing evidence
to support the verdict of the trial jury and the judgment of
the Court and neither, under the circumstances, should be
disturbed.

RESPONDENT'S POINT II.
WAS DEFENDANT ABSOLVED FROM PAYING
BECAUSE OF QUALITY OF THE WORK?
The contract between the Plaintiff and Defendant wa;
not breached by the Plaint'ff. Even if some of the J~_bor
performed at the ('Xpres;.; request of the defendant, (Exs. 1,
2, and 3) ; and if scme small repair item was not completed in the manner in which the defendant or his son or son'
in-law would have completed it does not tend to breach the
contract. So far as plaintiff could determine, the repairs,
the labor and suppilies furnished to the portion of the premises not leased by the p 1aintiff (Bradshaw Auto Parts
and Motel room units) were completed as requested by de·
fendant, and he acknowledge;; by ~tipulation (T 57-7) an
amount owing of $179.18 for ;~id repairs. The repairs in
the portion of the building being leased by plaintiff were to
make it tenantable for the pla ·ntiff. Plaintiff testified
that when he first discussed the proposed lease with the de·
fend2nt, TR 3~ line 4, that the building was l0aded with
junk, cans, lumber that had been torn out from the we .t
end of the building where there had been a second floor.
that there had bePn water damages through the ceiling- ti
the Motel; th?.t th8 floor Wil<; black in cnlor fr0m previotH
10

waxing and stains; that partitions were required. All of
these things were done as evidenced by Exhibits 6 & 7, and
hours of work performed and invoices of materials furni~hed, to satisfy the tenant (plaintiff).
Under such cirn1mst:rnce :, Plaintiff could not have breached the contract
and the payment for rent, which was due monthly, one-half
in cash and one-half in labor was tendered when Pla:ntiff
~ent defendant vo11cher" for materiah and supplies purchasd for his building and credited the repairs on the nonrenta) unit with tte materia's and rnpplie~ to the defendant. The defendant was requested to acknowledge and credit the plaintiff in his rent with th2 items above mentioned.
Plaintiff had expended in labor and materials and supplies
for the defendant's building in excess of $1980.87, and had
received approximately three months rent. Plaintiff was
not in default and the jury were justified in determining
as they did in their verdict, that the rent was a proper
off-set against supplies and materials purchased for the
building in the sum of $708.71 a11d in repairs to both lea-ed
and non-leased portion of the building.
POINT NO. III.
REPLY TO APPELLANT'S QUANTUM MERUIT
The defendant spends considerable time in his brief
discmsing the submi-sion of the ca~e to the jury on quantum meruit. Plaintiff submits that the ca ~e was submitted to the jury on eYpres; and imp'ied contract clearly established by the evidence with itemized evidence to justify
the jury in their award, with the relp of three expert witnesc.es who helped to etablish that wcrk had in fact been
11

done; the supplies and materials had in fact been furni.:hed
and the value was in direct proportion to the itemized billing &ubmitted to the defendant by the plaintiff.
Respondent repre .ents that the instructions of the
Court No. 15, to which the defendant objects, to-wit: "If
you should further find that the plaintiff provided labor
and materials in remodeling and renovating clefenclant'"
busine2s in an amount equal to or in execs., of the re;1t required, then you may find that the plaintiff wa3 not in default and would be ent tled tJ require the p2rforman~e d
the defendant under the terms of the ag1 eem211t'', L a cc rect statement of the law. The jury could well find fr m
the clear and convincing t:::stimony in the ca e that defem:and did c we ior the labor and materials furnished
and from the evidence were justified in making an adjustmenJt as they found from the evidence in offsetting the
amount of plaintiff's award by correcting the transposition
of figures on the invoice from $58.00 to $.58 (T 241-27)
and were further justified by allowing defendant credit
for some property removed from the building by the plaintiff at the instance of the de!'endant, if they in f::ict found
that it was a proper item to be deducted frcm pla"ntiff's
award. Hence the verdict cf $1,229.00 for total repairs
and improvements (rather than $1,491.00 reque. t9d by the
plaintiff) le· s $490.00 for rent, for a net venlict of $739.00.

Defendant in hh brief excepts to t1e Court's in.-tructions Nos. 16 & ?.0. The Court's in:tructi0n No. 16 iR n
correc>t statement rif the law and the near ioentical ~urte is

found in Williston on Contracts or in the restatement of
the law of contracts, and as is so quoted herein. AM Jur
2d, Vol. 17, pg. 334, 335. Also, ln::,truction No. 22 of the
Court provides correctly for an offset and the jury correctly interpreted the instruction and appJ:ed the law in granting the defendant full credit as offset again.,,t the repair3
and improvements.
POINT IV
BILATERAL PERFORMANCE
The further point rai:::ed in the Appellant's brief is
that becau:oe $245.00 cash was not tendered to the defendant for one-half of the rental, even though the plaintiff
had performed $179.18 in labor on otlher prem[ses for the
defendant, which defendant agreed to pay, and had purchased materials and supplies from Peterson Machine Company, used in defendant's building at a cost of $708.71,
that Plaintiff was barred from claiming the amount due
him, because of Plaintiff's breach. Plaintfff alleges that
with these sums due from the defendant in cash, that there
was not such a breach of the agreement by the plaint' ff a•
would permit Defendant to refuse to make payment for the
labor and supplies furnished as a_<;;reed upcn by the parties.
Where two or more performance3 are promised by
each party. promises of one or m1re of the performances
on each side may he promises for an agreed exchange. The
Court was following the general rule of cm_ tructive conditions in promises for an agreed exchange in the instructions to the Jury. A conci~e shtement of the law applicable is found in the re-statement of the law of contracts,
Sec. 266, pg. 382, from which we quote.
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"There can be no doubt that the parties consider not
only their promise,s in a bilateral contract as exchanged for each other, but also consider the performances promised as the subject of exchange. It
cannot be supposed that parties would exchange unconditional promi:::es, each promise being the consideration for the other, except on the as;;;umption that
they regarded the respective performances as also
subjects of exchange. When parties enter into an
ordinary bilateral contract, therefore, they contemplate a double exchange, first an exchange of promises and later an exchange of performances. The
performances are not necessarily to be rendered at
the same time, but the price of an autcmobile to
which a bilateral contract of purchase and sale relate;;; i3 the agreed exchange for the machir..e whether the pri2e is payable before or after delivery of the
machine or at the same time. It is so generally true
also that the performances to be exchanged are
treated by the parties as of equivalent value that
any exceptions are disregarded in favor of a uniform
rule.
The importance of the promises in a bilateral con·
tract being promises for an agreed exchange is to
produce a dependency between· the duties of the respective parties. The result is in most respects the
same as would be produced by inserting a requirement of the existence of appropriate condit:ons and,
therefore, as matter of terminology, it might be said
that such constructive conditions exist. There are,
however, some consequences due to the promised e~
change of performances which cannot without straJTI
be describerl. as due to a requirement of the existence
of constructive conditions."

14

The restatement of the law under subsection (3) of
the same paragraph deals with divisible contracts where a
contract is divisible by its terms. The performance of each
par1-ff by one party is the agreed exchange for a corresponding part by the other party. Quoting from the said
Subsection (3):
"If the performance of either party is inescapable

of divLion interpretation is easy, but where perform'.lnce due is stated as a number of units, usage in
the performance of s'milar contract> is frequently
the only guide in determining whether these units
are to be f'eparately performed as where the price
promised for a piece of work is ten dollars a day,
or for a quantity of lumber is $40 a thousand feet."

Section 267, page 386 gives the principle in the following language :

"Promises for an agreed exchange are concurrently
conditional, unless a contrary intention i'> clearly
manifested, if the promises can be simultaneously
performed and the parties can be assured thart they
are being so performed, where by the terms of the
promises
(a) the same time is fixed for the performof each promise ; or
(b) 3 fixed time i'> Ptated for the perform~nce
of one of the promises and no time is fixed for
the other; or
( c) no time is fixed for the performance of
either promise ; or
15

(d) the same period of time is fixed within
which each promise shall be performed.
a. The treatment of promises as concurrently con.
ditional is favored since each party is protected
by the privilege of withholding his performance until he receives performance by the other party. HmY
far such conditions are constructive rather than
based on an interpretation of the marnifested intention of the parties may be $Ubject to dispute, and
the answer may differ in different kinds of contracts. In Rome kinds long urnge of treating promise.3 falling within the rules of the Sedion as concurrently conditional has now resulted in making the
inference natural and perhaps nece~sary that the
partie3 int~nded simultaneous performar:cc, :, 1.i
that neither performance should be rendered unless
the other is also. It is immaterial, however, whether
such an intention is manifested. Justice requires
the result unless a contrail'~ initention is clearly
manifested."
1

Based upon this long accepted principle the defend·
ant in the instant case cannot argue that lack of perform·
ance by the plaintiff had breached the Contract where defendant was required to perform concurrently on his agree·
ment to pay for certain improvements, materials, supplies
and repairs.

1fi

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Respondent respectfully requests this Court to affirm and uphold the
verdict of the trial jury, and the judgment of the trial
Court a3 being triers of the fact in the best position to
determine the crerlability of the testimony and the sufficiency of the evidence to justify the award.
Respectfully submitted,

ELDON A. ELIASON
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